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The	  headline	   claim	  of	   this	  engaging	  but	   frustrating	  book	   is	   that	   important	   insight	   is	   available	  
both	  into	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  and	  into	  its	  difficulty	  for	  us	  by	  viewing	  Wittgenstein	  as	  a	  species	  
of	  exile.	  Wittgenstein	  lived	  much	  of	  his	  life	  away	  from	  Austria,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  what	  Klagge	  wants	  
to	  emphasise.	  His	  proposal	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein	  may	  fruitfully	  be	  considered	  as	  having	  lived	  in	  
exile	  not	  from	  a	  homeland	  but	  from	  a	  ‘hometime’	  –	  specifically,	  from	  a	  period	  that	  ended	  with	  
the	  death	  of	  Schumann.	  The	  possibility	  of	   this	  perspective	   is	  provided	   in	   the	   first	   instance	  by	  
Wittgenstein’s	   reaction	   to	   Spengler’s	   philosophy	   of	   history.	   Spengler	   found	   in	   history	   a	  
repeated	  pattern	  of	  growth,	  maturity	  and	  decline.	  The	  maturity	  of	  an	  era	  was	  termed	  ‘culture’	  
and	   is	   associated	   by	   Spengler	   with	   ‘organism’;	   an	   era’s	   decline	   is	   termed	   ‘civilisation’	   and	  
associated	  with	  ‘mechanism’.	  Instantiating	  this	  pattern	  is	  the	  Western	  Era,	  which	  moved	  from	  
culture	   to	  decline	  over	   the	   course	  of	   the	  nineteenth	   century.	   To	  an	  extent,	   as	  Klagge	   shows,	  
Wittgenstein	   appears	   to	   have	   accepted	   this	   narrative.	   And	   crucially	   for	   Klagge’s	   purposes,	  
Wittgenstein	  sometimes	  conceived	  of	  himself	  and	  of	  his	  work	  as	  belonging	  not	  to	  his	  own	  time	  
of	  western	  civilisation	  but	  to	  its	  preceding	  period	  of	  culture.	  
	   The	   details,	   at	   least,	   of	   Spengler’s	   story	   are	   somewhat	   dubious.	   	   When	   considering	  
Wittgenstein’s	  thought	  as	  opposed	  to	  his	  self-­‐conception	  Klagge	  therefore	  soft	  pedals	  much	  of	  
its	  historical	  specifics	  and	  focuses	  instead	  on	  the	  story’s	  atemporal	  characterisations	  of	  culture	  
and	  civilisation.	   	  The	   intellectual	   spirit	  of	  civilisation,	  exemplified	  centrally	  by	  Socrates,	   is	  one	  
which	   looks	   everywhere	   for	   scientific	   precision	   of	   a	   certain	   kind,	   one	   which	   insists	   on	   a	  
mechanistic	  picture	  of	  causation,	  and	  one	  which	  presses	  for	  deeper	  and	  deeper	  explanation.	  A	  
cultural	   spirit,	   by	   contrast,	   ceases	   asking	   for	   explanation	   sooner	   rather	   than	   later,	   finds	  
precision	   without	   mimicking	   science,	   and	   doesn’t	   need	   to	   understand	   causation	  
mechanistically.	   	  What	  Klagge	  wants	  then	  to	  endorse	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  ‘cultured’	  
thought	  contrasts	  in	  these	  ways	  with	  the	  ‘civilised’	  currents	  dominant	  both	  in	  his	  times	  and	  in	  
ours.	   	   Disappointingly	   little	   effort	   is	   expended,	   however,	   either	   on	   explaining	   the	   individual	  
strands	  of	  this	  contrast	  or	  on	  tying	  them	  together	  as	  strands	  of	  a	  single	  contrast.	  	  Klagge	  does	  
not	   substantially	   address,	   for	   example,	   the	   question	   arising	   of	   what	   Socrates’	   quests	   for	  
necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  have	  to	  do	  with	  being	  in	  thrall	  of	  science.	  
The	   broadest	   of	   Klagge’s	   proposals	   for	   putting	   his	   idea	   of	  Wittgenstein	   as	   an	   exile	   to	  
work	   is	   introduced	   in	   chapter	   2	   with	   a	   list	   of	   what	   is	   said	   in	   the	   Investigations	   to	   cause	  
philosophical	  problems	  to	  arise	  and/or	  remain.	  This	   includes:	  what	  holds	  us	  captive,	  what	  we	  
are	   tempted	  by,	  what	  suggests	   itself	   to	  us,	  how	  things	   look	   to	  us,	  what	  we	   find	  sensible,	  our	  
expectations,	   what	   we	   fail	   to	   see,	   what	   we	  would	   like,	   what	   we	   allow	   and	   how	  we	   look	   at	  
things.	   Klagge	   suggests	   that	   ‘the	   sum	   of	   such	   tendencies	   could	   be	   said	   to	   constitute	   a	  
temperament	  –	   a	   spirit	   of	   the	   [civilised]	   times’	   (pp.	   25-­‐6).	   It	   is	   the	   civilised	   intellectual	   spirit,	  
alien	  to	  Wittgenstein	  himself,	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  philosophical	  problems	  examined	  in	  his	  
later	  writings	  –	  writings	  which	  thus	  ‘address	  a	  reader	  who	  is	  imagined	  not	  to	  share	  the	  proper	  
temperament’	  (p.	  80).	  This	  same	  idea	  is	  pressed	  in	  chapter	  6	  where	  Klagge	  takes	  Wittgenstein’s	  
status	  as	  an	  exile	  to	  suit	  him	  to	  the	  role	  of	  philosopher:	  Wittgenstein	  can	  see	  more	  clearly	  the	  
mistakes	  which	  give	   rise	   to	   the	  philosophical	  problems	  with	  which	  he	  deals,	   for	   they	  are	  not	  
also	  his	  mistakes.	  Whilst	  some	  local	  insights	  may	  be	  available	  here,	  as	  a	  broad	  key	  this	  proposal	  
seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  considerably	  implausible.	  Wittgenstein’s	  work,	  more	  than	  that	  of	  any	  other	  
philosopher	   I	   can	   think	   of,	   is	   in	   general	   work	   not	   only	   for	   himself	   but	   also	   on	   himself.	   So	  
Wittgenstein	  writes	  not	  only:	  ‘The	  real	  discovery	  is	  the	  one	  that	  makes	  me	  capable	  of	  stopping	  
doing	  philosophy	  when	  I	  want	  to’	  (Philosophical	  Investigations,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2001,	  §133),	  
but	   also:	   ‘Working	   on	   philosophy	   is	   ...	   really	   more	   a	   working	   on	   oneself.	   On	   one’s	   own	  
interpretation.	  On	  one’s	  own	  way	  of	  seeing	  things’	  (Culture	  and	  Value,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  1998,	  
p.	  24).	  What	   is	  more,	   the	  cause	  of	  philosophical	  problems	  –	   including	   those	  with	  which	  he	   is	  
himself	  concerned	  –	  is	  standardly	  identified	  by	  Wittgenstein	  with	  something	  more	  permanent	  
than	   a	   Spenglerian	   spirit	   of	   civilisation.	   	   Wittgenstein	   does	   at	   one	   point	   pose	   himself	   the	  
question:	   	   ‘Are	  we	  dealing	  with	  errors…that	  are	  as	  old	  as	   language?...or	  are	   they	  of	  a	   special	  
nature,	  characteristic	  of	  our	  civilization?’	  (MS	  132,7;	  cited	  by	  Klagge	  at	  p168),	  but	  his	  familiar	  –	  
at	  least	  –	  answer	  is	  the	  first	  of	  these	  two:	  
	  
People	  say	  ...	  that	  the	  same	  philosophical	  problems	  which	  were	  already	  preoccupying	  the	  
Greeks	  are	  still	  troubling	  us	  today.	  ...	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  our	  language	  has	  stayed	  the	  same	  
and	  tempts	  us	  again	  and	  again	  towards	  the	  same	  questions.	  For	  as	  long	  as	  there	  will	  be	  a	  
verb	  ‘to	  be’,	  which	  seems	  to	  work	  like	  ‘to	  eat’	  and	  ‘to	  drink’,	  ...	  for	  as	  long	  as	  there	  will	  be	  
adjectives	  ‘identical’,	  ‘true’,	  ‘false’	  and	  ‘possible’,	  for	  as	  long	  as	  there	  will	  be	  talk	  of	  a	  flow	  
of	   time	   and	   of	   an	   expanse	   of	   space	   etc.,	   etc.,	   then	   people	  will	   run	   up	   against	   the	   same	  
puzzling	  difficulties	  again	  and	  again.	   (The	  Big	  Typescript,	  Oxford:	  Blackwell,	   2005,	  p.	  424;	  
c.f.,	  e.g.,	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus,	  London:	  Routledge,	  1922	  §3.323)	  
	  Perhaps	   the	   most	   substantial	   part	   of	   Klagge’s	   book,	   chapters	   7-­‐9,	   investigates	   how	  
science	  might	   be	   of	   interest	   to,	   or	   an	   influence	   on,	   philosophy.	  With	   this	   question	   in	   view,	  
Klagge	   distinguishes	   between	   a	   philosophical	   resolution	   and	   a	   conceptual	   resolution	   of	   a	  
philosophical	   problem.	   A	   philosophical	   resolution	   is	   provided,	   according	   to	   Klagge’s	  
Wittgenstein,	  by	  a	  synoptic	  view	  of	  our	  use	  of	  words,	  and	  there	  is	  here	  no	  role	  for	  science.	  It	  is	  
consistent	   with	   Wittgenstein’s	   views,	   however,	   that	   science	   can	   provide	   material	   for	   a	  
conceptual	  resolution	  of	  a	  philosophical	  problem	  –	  a	  resolution,	  that	   is,	   in	  which	  the	  problem	  
disappears	   in	   consequence	   of	   an	   evolution	   of	   our	   concepts.	   As	   the	   criteria	   for	   flu	   changed	  
under	   medical	   advances	   from	   various	   forms	   of	   suffering	   to	   an	   internal	   state	   causally	  
responsible	  for	  such	  suffering,	  so	  advances	   in	  neuroscience	  might	   lead	  our	  criteria	  for	  mental	  
states	  to	  change	  over	  time	  from	  behaviour	  to	  internal	  states	  –	  and	  if	  this	  were	  to	  happen	  then	  
‘the	  problem	  of	  the	  inverted	  spectrum	  will	  be	  resolved	  by	  direct	  inspection	  of	  people’s	  brains’	  
(p.	  89).	  	  Klagge	  does	  not	  discuss	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  ‘concept’,	  ‘criterion’	  or	  ‘behaviour’,	  but	  that	  
to	  one	  side,	  the	  obvious	  concern	  with	  his	   idea	  of	  a	  conceptual	  resolution	   is	  that	   if,	  e.g.,	  brain	  
states	  were	  to	  become	  criterial	  for	  mental	  states	  this	  wouldn’t	  resolve	  philosophical	  problems	  
of	  mentality	  so	  much	  as	  shift	  the	  meaning	  of	  words	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  those	  problems	  become	  
hidden	  from	  view.	  Klagge	  considers	  something	  like	  this	  objection	  (p.	  92)	  and	  appears	  to	  reply	  to	  
it	   that	  Wittgenstein	  did	  not	  take	  concepts	  to	  be	   immune	  from	  revision	  or	  even	  rejection	  (the	  
examples	   are	   given	  of	   ‘force’	   and	   ‘wound	   shock’	   (p.	   94))	   –	   but	   it	   is	   unclear	  how	   this	   reply	   is	  
intended	  to	  be	  effective.	  
Some	   sense	   of	   Klagge’s	   perspective	   here	   may	   be	   had	   by	   considering	   that,	   as	   he	  
understands	   it,	   identity	  theory	   in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  claims	  that	   ‘ordinary	   [psychological]	  
concepts	  can	  become,	  ...	  or	  turn	  out	  to	  be,	  ...	  technical	  concepts.	  The	  eliminative	  materialist,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  proposes	  that	  ordinary	  concepts	  be	  replaced	  with	  technical	  concepts’	  (p.	  88).	  
Wittgenstein,	  Klagge	   subsequently	  presses,	   ‘has	  no	  principled	  opposition	   to	  eliminativism’	   (p.	  
152).	  This	  latter,	  highly	  surprising	  remark,	  and	  also	  the	  very	  odd	  claim	  regarding	  identity	  theory	  
(an	   identity	   theorist	   of	   lightning	   does	   not,	   I	   take	   it,	   think	   the	   concept	   ‘lightning’	   will	  
become/turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  technical/scientific	  concept),	  are	  both	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
Klagge	   takes	   his	   two	   characterisations	   more	   or	   less	   as	   definitions.	   Identity	   theory	   and	  
eliminativism	  are	  theses	  not	  about	  the	  nature	  or	  existence	  of	  mental	  states,	  theses	  which	  might	  
lead	  to	  predictions	  or	  recommendations	  about	  the	  development	  of	  our	  mental	  concepts:	  they	  
are	  rather	  those	  predictions	  or	  recommendations	  themselves.	  
A	   focus	   on	   human	   concepts	   is	   also	   found	   in	   chapter	   8’s	   related	   discussion	   of	  
Wittgenstein’s	   remarks	   on	   ‘non-­‐mediative	   causality’.	   Famously,	   Wittgenstein	   imagines	   a	  
situation	  in	  which	  seeds	  from	  two	  different	  types	  of	  plant	  are	  internally	  indistinguishable,	  each	  
seed	  nonetheless	  growing	  into	  a	  plant	  of	  the	  same	  type	  as	  that	  by	  which	  it	  was	  produced.	  It	  is	  in	  
the	  spirit	  of	  our	  civilised,	  science-­‐dominated	  times,	  Klagge	  suggests,	  to	  insist	  that	  if	  seeds	  grow	  
into	  different	   kinds	  of	  plants	   there	  must	  be	  an	   internal	  difference	  between	   them;	  a	   cultured	  
spirit	   by	   contrast	  might	   happily	   drop	   that	   insistence.	   Rather	   than	   ask	  which	   party	   would	   be	  
correct,	  however,	  –	  could	  there	  be	  ‘unmediated	  causality’?	  –	  Klagge	  discusses	  at	  length	  a	  range	  
of	   scientific,	   sociological	   and	   psychological	   circumstances	   in	  which	  we	  might	   be	   prepared	   to	  
‘give	  up	   the	  urge	   to	   look	   for,	   ...	   or	   at	   least	  believe	   in	   the	  existence	  of,	  mediating	  differences	  
where	   there	   are	   different	   effects’	   (p.	   107).	   	   Now	   such	   discussion	   as	   to	   how	   our	   causal	   –	   or	  
mental	   –	   concepts	  might	   develop	   in	   certain	   circumstances	   is	   of	   course	   just	   fine.	   	   (So	   too	   is	  
Klagge’s	   discussion	   of	  whether	  we	  might	  want	   to	   hold	   back	   on	   neuroscience	   because	   of	   the	  
harm	   of	   the	   conceptual	   changes	   which	   its	   advances	   might	   provoke	   (pp.	   120-­‐122).)	   But	   its	  
relevance	  to	  philosophy	  is	  unclear.	  	  In	  the	  future,	  ‘science	  might	  [indeed]	  have	  a	  different	  role	  
in	  society’	   (p.	  108,	  a	   section	  heading)	   such	   that	   its	   insistence	  on	  mediated	  causality	  does	  not	  
dominate	  our	  thinking	  –	  but	  what	  has	  this	  to	  do	  with	  causation?	  It	  may	  indeed	  be	  that	  advances	  
in	  neuroscience	  will	  prompt	  us	  to	  change	  or	  even	  abandon	  our	  folk	  psychological	  concepts,	  but	  
–	   returning	   to	  our	   initial	   concern	  –	   it	   is	  easy	   to	   think	   that	   in	   itself	   this	  matter	   is	   irrelevant	   to	  
philosophical	  problems	  surrounding	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  inverted	  spectrum.	  
Failures	   to	   connect	   adduced	   psychological	   and	   sociological	   considerations	   with	  
substantive	  philosophy	  are	  evident	  also	  in	  discussions	  where	  science	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  concern.	  	  
In	  chapter	  10,	  for	  example,	  Klagge	  discusses	  various	  cases	  of	  people	  differing	  in	  their	  willingness	  
to	   stop	   asking	   for	   moral,	   religious	   or	   philosophical	   explanation,	   and	   he	   makes	   it	   clear	   that	  
Wittgenstein’s	   sympathies	  are	   in	  each	  case	  with	   those	  who	  stop	  sooner.	  But	  here	  where	  you	  
might	  think	  the	  discussion	  would	  begin,	  it	  in	  fact	  ends.	  The	  implicit	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  non-­‐
Wittgensteinians	   are	   wrong	   to	   carry	   on	   asking,	   that	   they	   go	   ‘too	   far’	   (p.	   141),	   but	   no	  
philosophical	   account	   is	   attempted	   of	   why	   or	   in	   what	   sense	   this	   is	   so.	   	   For	   a	   general	  
characterisation	  both	  of	   this	   complaint	   and	  of	   the	  previous	  discussion,	  we	   can	  note	   that	   the	  
basic	  tool	  of	  Klagge’s	  book	  appears	  on	  review	  neither	  as	  the	  headline	  idea	  of	  an	  exile,	  nor	  as	  the	  
twin	  notions	  of	  culture	  and	  civilisation,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  recurrent,	  underlying	  idea	  of	  ‘differences	  
of	   temperament’.	   	   Such	   a	   tool	   may	   be	   useful	   where	   what	   is	   sought	   is	   a	   psychological	  
explanation	  of,	   say,	  Wittgenstein’s	   taking	   the	  views	  he	  did,	  of	  his	  writing	  as	  he	  did,	  or	  of	  our	  
finding	  it	  difficult	  to	  understand	  or	  to	  agree	  with	  him.	  	  Where	  one	  is	  after,	  rather,	  an	  explication	  
or	  assessment	  of	  philosophical	   content,	   the	   tool	   is	   less	  obviously	  appropriate	   for	   the	   job.	   	  At	  
times,	   Klagge’s	   text	   appears	   to	   acknowledge	   an	   inappropriateness	   by	   leaving	   matters	   of	  
content	  unaddressed	  –	  and	  here	  one	   is	   left	   frustrated.	   	  At	  others,	   the	  text	  appears	   to	  do	  the	  
opposite,	   to	   assume	   without	   explanation	   that	   discussion	   of	   psychological	   temperament	   is	  
relevant	  to	  philosophical	  content	  –	  and	  one	  is	  left	  confused.	  
As	  these	  comments	  indicate,	  I	  found	  Klagge’s	  book	  uncompelling	  in	  the	  large.	  	  This	  said,	  
the	   book	   is	   surprisingly	   enjoyable,	   and	   even,	   in	   the	   small,	   highly	   engaging.	   Klagge	   writes	  
extremely	  well	  and	  shows	  an	  unusually	  high	   level	  of	  scholarship.	  Citations	   from	  both	  obscure	  
and	  well	   known	   texts	   are	   brought	   into	   contact	  with	   obscure	   and	  well	   known	   episodes	   from	  
Wittgenstein’s	   life,	   and	   the	   resulting	   explorations	   are	   at	   the	   very	   least	   always	   interesting.	   A	  
wide	   variety	   of	   case	   studies	   –	   for	   instance	  of	   divergent	   attitudes	   towards	   the	   explanation	  of	  
misfortune	  in	  The	  Brothers	  Karamazov	  –	  are	  thoughtfully	  and	  often	  convincingly	  presented	  and	  
discussed.	  It	  is	  a	  shame	  that	  this	  rich	  but	  largely	  pre-­‐philosophical	  groundwork	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  
more	  philosophical	  penetration.	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